Federal Antitrust Law and the Royal Drug Pharmacy Agreement: Implications for Formulating National Health Policy by Richard, Mary Holloway
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 2 
1-1-1981 
Federal Antitrust Law and the Royal Drug Pharmacy Agreement: 
Implications for Formulating National Health Policy 
Mary Holloway Richard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary H. Richard, Federal Antitrust Law and the Royal Drug Pharmacy Agreement: Implications for 
Formulating National Health Policy, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1981), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND THE




In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act' to exempt
the "business of insurance" 2 from the federal antitrust laws. In 1979,
in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,' the
Supreme Court construed that exemption not to include "cost contain-
ment agreements'"4 between a health insurer and licensed pharmacists.
Even though the case has been remanded and the Court has not yet
ruled on the validity of the agreement under the antitrust laws,5 the
decision by the Supreme Court will be an important factor in the na-
tional health policy debate. The context in which the agreement arose
© 1981 Mary Holloway Richard
*B.A., 1972, Oklahoma; M.P.H., 1974, Health Planning and Hospital Administration,
Oklahoma; J.D., 1980, George Washington. Associate, Spradling, Alpern, Friot & Gum,
Oklahoma City.-Ed.
'15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
Id. The McCarran-Ferguson Act reads in pertinent part: "§ 1011. Congress hereby
declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of in-
surance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed
to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
"§ 1012(b). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of in-
surance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the
Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
"§ 1013(b). Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inap-
plicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate or act of boycott, coercion, or intimi-
dation."
440 U.S. 205 (1979).
4 Respondents argued in their brief to the Supreme Court that characterization of the
agreement as a cost containment agreement is an inaccurate description of an actual price-fixing
agreement and also questioned the right of the insurer to function as an agent to contain costs.
Brief for Respondent at 57-64, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979).
, Regarding the complaint, an appeal on the merits is planned by the plaintiffs. Cf.
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), where the court on remand
from the Supreme Court in light of the Royal Drug decision held that vertical agreements be-
tween insurers and automobile repair shops which determined where insureds could go for
repairs at prevailing labor rates passed muster under the antitrust laws because there was neither
anticompetitive effect nor purpose.
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and the antitrust challengqs leveled against the agreement are con-
sidered in this article. It is suggested that application of the antitrust
laws, coupled with legislative intervention, could bolster competition
in the ailing health industry and thereby drive down the cost of health
care.
The Royal Drug Agreement: History, Antitrust Challenges,
Judicial Treatment
In 1969, Blue Shield of Texas, a nonprofit insurer, sought
authorization for issuing new policy forms. The proposed agreement,
for which authorization was required by state law, was filed in March,
disapproved in May, 6 and exempted from the approval requirements in
September. Subsequent statewide mailings to licensed pharmacists
resulted in a number of agreements between Blue Shield and phar-
macies throughout Texas. The insurance policy at issue in Royal Drug,
almost a duplicate of the 1969 agreement, was approved in October,
1974, by the Insurance Commissioner of Texas for use in Bexar Coun-
ty, Texas. Blue Shield offered to enter into the Pharmacy Agreement
with all licensed pharmacists in that county that same year.
Terms of the Insurer-Pharmacist Agreement
The agreement in question was first offered by Blue Shield to cer-
tain groups in Texas as a prescription drug insurance policy sup-
plemental to its group medical-surgical policies.' Insurers first entered
the field of health insurance in order to increase business and profits
through the sales of comprehensive policies to large employers, 9 and
6 Although not pertinent to the analysis presented in this article, counsel for the nonpar-
ticipating pharmacies have argued that approval of the Pharmacy Agreement was not denied by
the state; rather, approval of a large form embodying the Pharmacy Agreement was denied and
later approved. Reply Brief for Appellants at 7, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). This goes to the argument concerning state regulation of insurance
which Blue Shield used unsuccessfully to fight losing the antitrust exemption.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, 440 U.S. 205.
See Brief for Respondents at 5, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
' In many cases, health insurance is thrown in as a "sweetener" for a highly profitable
package, including life insurance, disability, and even casualty insurance. B. ERENREtCH & J.
EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE: POWER, PROFITS & POLITICS 109-10 (1970). On
group policies, the industry claims to lose money, and they claim that the investment income
which companies attribute to their health insurance business is barely adequate to cover the
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Blue Shield has found an increasing demand in the prescription drug
area."1
Under the Pharmacy Agreement, the participating pharmacy
agrees to accept from the insured no more than the two dollar deduct-
ible in full payment for each dispensed drug; the participating phar-
macist is then entitled to file a claim for additional reimbursement
directly from Blue Shield."
The following example was supplied by the Justice Department
and cited by the Supreme Court in its decision,' 2 and it illustrates the
operation of the insurance policy and the Pharmacy Agreement:
Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X
charged both by "participating" Pharmacy A and "non-participating"
Pharmacy B is $10.00, and the wholesale price (or acquisition cost) to
both is $8.00. If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy A, the insured
pays $2.00. Pharmacy A receives $2.00 from the insured and $8.00
from Blue Shield, or $10.00 total. If an insured buys Drug X from
Pharmacy B, the insured pays Pharmacy B $10.00, and receives $6.00
(75 percent of the difference between the retail price and $2.00) from
Blue Shield. While Pharmacy B receives the same as Pharmacy A, the
insured must pay $4.00 for the drug and also must take steps to obtain
reimbursement.
If the pharmacy's acquisition cost for the drug is $5.00 rather
than $8.00, the situations of Pharmacy B and the insured are un-
changed. But now Pharmacy A will receive only $5.00 from Blue
Shield, for a total of $7.00.13
Blue Shield sent a standard form letter to all licensed pharmacists
in the state offering them the opportunity to enter into a pharmacy
agreement with Blue Shield.' There were apparently no negotiations
with or among pharmacists following the offer.' 5 Blue Shield charac-
terized the plan as a service benefit insurance plan utilizing health care
provider agreements.' 6 Blue Shield perceived that it was meeting a
0 Brief for Appellants at 4, Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d
1375 (5th Cir. 1977). Blue Shield in its brief to the Fifth Circuit illustrated this demand with the
following example: "Between early 1972 and October, 1975, alone, there was a 3,100% increase
in the number of pharmaceutical claims processed by Blue Shield under the policy. In October,
1975, Blue Shield was handling these claims at the rate of approximately 31,000 claims per
month as compared with only 1,000 claims per month in early 1972 ... "
" Brief for Respondents at 5, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
" 440 U.S. 205 n.3.
" Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at n.1, 440 U.S. 205.
" Brief for Petitioners at 8, 440 U.S. 205.
" Id.
16 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, 440 U.S. 205.
19811
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policyholder need to offset ever more costly medical care by offering
coverage in the form of goods and services rather than in the form of
cash reimbursement, and by assuming the responsibility of paying for
policy benefits.' 7 Blue Shield characterized the Pharmacy Agreement
as an insurance policy covering the risk that a policyholder will need to
obtain prescription drugs;' 8 the process would aid policyholders in
finding low-overhead pharmacies with which to deal.' 9
The participating pharmacies named as defendants by Royal
Drug are large, high-volume chains that sell many nonpharmaceutical
items."0 Although participation in the Pharmacy Agreement may be
attractive in terms of potential increased volume of pharmaceutical
sales, it is more likely that pharmacies are induced to participate by the
prospect of increased sales in nonpharmaceuticals, such as household
or personal items, to persons entering their stores for the purpose of
having a prescription filled." The nonparticipating pharmacists are,
on the other hand, largely independent retailers selling only phar-
maceuticals, and many of them provide special services such as home
deliveries, patient consultation, and twenty-four hour service.22
The subscriber who patronizes a nonparticipating pharmacy must
ultimately pay 25 percent of a reasonable charge for the drug as deter-
mined by Blue Shield plus the two dollar professional dispensing fee or
deductible. In other words, the subscriber in that situation must take
the initiative to go to the insurer for reimbursement and even then is
only reimbursed for a portion of the charge. Royal Drug pharmacy
perceives this system as placing an onerous burden on the subscriber
'7 Id.
I d.
Id. The Justice Department stated that Blue Shield offered to deal directly with any
pharmacy willing to accept a low price for its services and that any pharmacy that can distribute
drugs for two dollars or less per prescription could accept Blue Shield's offer. Brief for Appel-
lant at 6, 556 F.2d 1375. The nonparticipants argued that the 2 percent mark-up ceiling effected
by this Pharmacy Agreement would not even cover their costs.
20 The participating pharmacies are three retail pharmacy chains-Walgreen's, Sommers,
and Rieger. Brief for Respondent at 4, 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Respondent's brief provides some
insight into the character of those chain stores at 8, n.5: "In a recent newspaper advertisement,
Petitioner Sommers advertised the following items for sale in its discount 'drug stores': Spalding
Tennis Set, Golden Ram Golf Balls, Delux Car Caddy with CB Mike Holder, beach towels,
plastic coated playing cards ... Lone Star beer... Fritos Corn Chips... coloring books, Right
Guard Deodorant, Schick Super II Razor, L'Oreal Preference Shampoo and Revlon Nail Polish.
San Antonio Express, June 6, 1978, at 9-A."
1, Nonparticipating pharmacies have argued that their services have not been taken into
account in the reimbursement formula used by Blue Shield. While such a reimbursement formula
works well for the large, multi-product chain stores, the independent pharmacy offering only
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that results in coercing, subscribers to boycott nonparticipating phar-
macists.23
Judicial Treatment of the Royal Drug Complaint
As a result of the Blue Shield plan, eighteen independent phar-
macy owners in Bexar County, Texas, brought an action in federal
district court against Blue Shield of Texas and three participating retail
drugstore chains for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
plaintiffs alleged both combination and conspiracy to fix prices by the
participating pharmacies and the insurer, as well as an illegal
boycott.
24
The district court's decision25 that the McCarran-Ferguson ex-
emption applied to the agreement in question was reversed on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit.26 The court of appeals found that the exemption
did not apply because three prerequisites to its application had not
been met. First, Blue Shield had no obligation to fix retail prices of
pharmaceuticals. Second, the activity was not regulated by the state
simply because the state had a general regulatory scheme regarding
insurance. Third, the activity was not the "business of insurance"
solely because it affected rates." In so holding, the Fifth Circuit con-
tradicted not only several district court cases, but also a long-standing
construction of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. 8
Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion, upheld the appel-
late court decision and rejected the blanket exemption for insurers. 29
The Court found a narrow construction of section 2(b) of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act3" to be particularly appropriate where the agreement
involves persons wholly outside the insurance industry, and the Court
reaffirmed the three requirements for application of the exemption.3
Four justices dissented, interpreting the legislative history not to have
intended such narrow limits to the exemption and criticizing the ma-
3 See note 19 supra.
24 Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343, 345 (W.D. Tex.
1976).
2, This decision followed the majority rule. See notes 57-58 infra and accompanying text.
26 Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
27 Id. at 1381.
28 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated,
440 U.S. 942 (1979), Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 860 (1977); Anderson v. Medical Serv. of the District of Columbia, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1977); Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
a 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
20 See note 2 supra; see also notes 41-53 infra and accompanying text.
" 440 U.S. 205, 210, 231 (1979).
19811
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jority for limiting the "business of insurance" to horizontal transac-
tions or transactions that spread the risk of loss between the insurer
and the insured.2
Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Health Sector:
Treatment of Insurers
History of the Exemption for Insurer
The purpose of the federal antitrust laws is clear" even though
judicial interpretation has appeared less than entirely consistent at
times.3 ' Preceding the passage of the Sherman Act was an increasing
awareness of the burgeoning power of big business in America and
abuses of that power. Congressional response to protect the public and
to preserve the market structure was passage of the Sherman Act in
1890. Application of the Sherman and Clayton" acts between 1890
and 1944 produced a body of court-made law to restore the prized
competition to various sectors of the economy. 6
Dictum in Paul v. Virginia,37 only six years after the passage of
32 Id. at 233. The dissent would have held the agreement within the "business of in-
surance" exemption because the agreement affected costs directly and was a direct arrangement
to provide services, precisely the risk assumed in the policy, and because of the state interest in
the financial viability of such plans and in the control of formulas by which providers are reim-
bursed by insurers. According to the dissent, relevant precedent has not interpreted section 2(b)
to require limiting application of the exemption to insurer-insured agreements; the minority
points out that rate agreements among insurers, clearly exempted, do not spread the risk. 1d. at
248-49.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Justice Black said of the legislative intent in enacting the
Sherman Act: "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liber-
ty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
cur economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions." N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
But see Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 802, 806 n.32 (1981), demon-
strating that courts and scholars do not agree on the purpose of the legislation-whether it is to
maximize efficiecey, to protect competition for its own sake, or to achieve other ends.
1' For oft-used examples of apparent inconsistencies in Supreme Court antitrust opi-
nions, compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) with United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1976). For a report of four relatively recent and ap-
parently inconsi;tent Supreme Court cases, see Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield
and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional
Perspective, 1978 DuKa L.J. 389, 399 n.52 [hereinafter cited as Blumstein & Calvani].
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
,' See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (discussion of application of
rule of reason doctrine).
11 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). See discussion in United States v. South-eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 543 (1944), of reaffirmation by the courts of the Paul dictum
that issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction in commerce.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/3
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the Sherman Act, set a trend that lasted nearly a century. The Court in
Paul declared that the insurance business was neither trade nor com-
merce within the purpose of the commerce clause.38 As a result, the
insurance industry was regulated freely by the states, particularly with
regard to rate setting and taxation. It was generally thought that
federal regulation did not apply in the area of insurance and that
exemption from the federal antitrust laws was by virtue of the failure
of the insurance industry to qualify as either trade or commerce."9 The
equilibrium was shattered with the exposure of reprehensible conduct
within the insurance industry and the Supreme Court response in
1944. 40 In United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 4' ini-
tiated by the Justice Department after interpreting a prior decision as
holding that a health maintenance organization was engaged in trade
for purposes of the Sherman Act, the defendant insurance company's
only defense to charges of price fixing and monopoly was that the
business of insurance was neither trade nor commerce.4 2 The Supreme
Court rejected this either/or treatment of antitrust regulation, holding
that activities intimately related to state welfare could be subject to
state regulation while other activities could be regulated by the federal
government.43 Relying on the sweeping "every person" language of
the commerce clause," the Court found that neither the clause nor the
cases construing it granted a blanket exemption from the bounds of
interstate commerce. 41 The majority recognized the value of competi-
tion, stating that competition would be harmful neither to the insurer
nor to the insured, and pointed out that no state had authorized com-
11 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 183.
39 Id.
" United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
" American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 519 (1943). The attorney general in the South-eastern Underwriters case believed that the
plan was insurance, and he brought the indictment thinking that the Court had already held that
insurance was commerce; this fact is recognized by the Supreme Court in the Royal Drug opi-
nion. 440 U.S. 205, 225 (1979).
42 United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 534, 535 (1944). Associa-
tion members represented 90 percent of the total business of six states where noncompetitive
premium rates on fire and allied lines of insurance were fixed by the association. The association
employed boycotts, coercion, and intimidation to force nonmembers to buy insurance only from
association members and only on association terms. The lower court had sustained the defendant
insurance company's demurrer solely because the "entire" business of insurance could never be
commerce, even though a substantial part of the business was interstate within the meaning of
the antitrust laws. Id. at 536.
11 Id. at 548. For a discussion of the legislative history, see Weller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 587 [hereinafter cited as Weller].
14 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Is 322 U.S. 534, 561 (1944).
1981]
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binations of insurance companies to engage in coercive or restrictive
activities and that insurance companies had no vested right to engage
in such practices."
Perceiving this decision as a threat to both the insurance industry
and to state regulation of that industry, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 to exempt insurance activities from
federal antitrust regulation if three conditions were met .' 7 An analysis
of the legislative history, according to one commentator, indicates that
the Act essentially codifies the Parker doctrine 8 with regard to the in-
surance business 9 and that a two-step test is appropriate for correct
application of section 2(b) of the Act:
First one must determine whether the federal antitrust laws "invalidate,
impair, or supersede" state insurance regulation of the anticompetitive
activities in question, as that standard has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court in National Securities. If not, no exemption should be
granted. Second, if federal law does "invalidate, impair, or supersede"
state insurance regulation, then the federal antitrust laws are inappli-
cable only to the extent that anticompetitive conduct is regulated by
state insurance laws.
50
Subsequent Development and Application of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act Exemption
The legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act has been
interpreted by courts to exclude from the "business of insurance" the
following: annuity contracts,' mergers between insurance companies,"2
46 Id. at 562.
" See text at notes 26-27.
" Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (interpretation of Sherman Act to apply to indi-
vidual and not state action). See also Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflec-
tions on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975); Comment, The State Action Exemp-
tion in Antitrust: From Parker v. Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1978 DUKE L.J. 871;
Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 34.
4 Weller, supra note 43, at 593. Weller provides an extensive review of the legislative
history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and concludes that the act "implements fundamentally
federalist, congressional purposes. Congress was primarily concerned with preserving state taxa-
tion and regulation of insurance from constitutional annihilation and did not intend to
emasculate the federal antitrust laws. Contrary to the thrust of some lower court decisions, Con-
gress never intended state regulation to be exclusive if federal and state authority could be
accommodated concurrently. Preserving state regulation under principles of federalism requires
preemption under the McCarran Act only when the concurrent authority of both sovereigns is
irreconcilable." Id. at 640.
1' Id. at 640-41.
" SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
s2 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/3
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Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans and other prepaid plans," and insur-
ance advertising.14 A series of cases interpreted the legislative history
of the Act to focus on such characteristics of insurance as the under-
writing risks in which companies engage in exchange for premium
payments, the relationship between the insurer and the insured, and
the regulation by the state of rates as evidence of state interest in
financial viability. 5 The courts have had to resort to focusing on the
nature of insurance when the appropriateness of applying this exemp-
tion is at issue."6
A review of judicial treatment of cases involving section 2(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicates that the courts have failed to
apply the exemption narrowly in contradiction of accepted tenets of
statutory construction." Generous judicial construction of the term
"insurance" includes a host of activities generally related to the inter-
ests of the insurer and the insured. 8 The division within the circuits
compelling the Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari in the
Royal Drug case rested on just this issue.
The Third Circuit, in a 1973 case, held that approval by the state
insurance department constituted regulation by the state sufficient to
exempt an arrangement whereby a nonprofit insurer reimbursed a hos-
pital for services provided its subscribers at a discount. 9 In the District
" Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Michigan Hosp. Serv.
v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.,
101 R.I. 708, 227 A.2d 105 (1967). See also dissent in Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 240-42 n.9
(1979).
FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
For a representative case, see note 11 supra and acccompanying text.
56 See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
See generally, 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRucTION (4th ed. Sands 1973).
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text (Proctor decision represents majority view-
point) (Manasen decision far-reaching in application of antitrust laws to nonprofit corporation
engaged in operation of prepaid dental care program). See also notes 59-63 infra and accom-
panying text.
11 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1973). The arrangement challenged in this case by a
private insurer is typical of nonprofit insurers' arrangements with providers whereby lower reim-
bursement rates are negotiated. The lower rate is achieved by the hospital agreeing that costs ap-
plied to the favored subscribers will not include costs for capital construction or bad debts or
costs of charity care. These arrangements are attractive to the hospitals because they represent
guaranteed payments for services rendered the nonprofit insurers' subscribers. Note that in dic-
tum the Third Circuit professed its belief that, if applied, the agreement could withstand anti-
trust scrutiny. Id. at 84. See also Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 417 F.
Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977). Cf. Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954), indicat-
ing that courts have continued to hold that Blue Shield plans are not insurance even in states
with enabling statutes which typically authorize plans to operate but do not specify whether they
1981]
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of Columbia Circuit, it was held that an agreement between auto
repairers and insurers to pay only prevailing rates for labor and parts
was exempt by virtue of state regulation of the business of insurance
and, more important, because the agreement was peculiar to the busi-
ness of insurance.60 Settlement and payment of claims were considered
basic components of the contractual obligation owed by insurance
companies to insureds, which directly affected the rate-making struc-
ture of the insurance company and the premium charged, and which
was directly connected with the policy writing, interpretation, and en-
forcement.'" In affirming the summary judgment, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia disagreed with the district court's
narrow interpretation of the boycott exception to the antitrust exemp-
tion created by the McCarran-Ferguson Act." It is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded this case, Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co., for further consideration in light of its decision in the Royal
Drug case.63 In Royal Drug, the Fifth Circuit, in more strictly
scrutinizing the bounds of that exemption, viewed the underwriting
function as the insurer's essential obligation and was unwilling to be
persuaded that a reimbursement agreement was exempt merely because
the premium was directly affected by such an agreement. 6
Other Applications of the Antitrust Laws in Health Care
Providers of health services of all types are cognizant of the
federal antitrust laws today. Administrators and legal counsel for
constitute insurance. Blue Cross and Blue Shield have historically taken the position that they
are not insurance companies. Further, they enjoy a favorable bargaining position which virtually
forces providers to pass costs not reimbursed by the "Blues" to uninsured patients and patients
insured by commercial insurers. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into it
properly, the subject of that favored position is now ripe for reassessment from a policy perspec-
tive. This is particularly appropriate if the Blues are reaping great profits as their critics suggest.
60 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27, 30 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd,
561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979). See also Webster County Memorial
Hosp. Inc. v. UlvW Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 1976-1 TRADE CASES 68,888 (D.D.C.
1976) (no antitrust violation where union fund negotiated maximum per diem for beneficiaries'
medical care) (no decision on antitrust immunity).
" 406 F. Supp. at 27. See also Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657,
669 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
62 561 F.2d 262, 271-73 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
613 440 U.S. 942 (1979).
64 556 F.2d 1375, 1386 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit expressed serious disagreement
with the rationale underlying the Manasen decision which indicated that participants need not be
strictly limited to insurance companies for the business of insurance protection to apply; the
court distinguished Travelers as mere approval by the Third Circuit of actions of the state insur-
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hospitals, for example, currently evaluate all segments of hospital
operations for anticompetitive activities in an effort to avoid costly
litigation."' The exclusive contract, a management alternative
employed in some hospital departments, 66 does exclude some practi-
tioners from hospital privileges; this exclusion has been challenged as a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 67 A number of courts have
relied on a rule of reason analysis and have found that reasonable
decisions pass muster. 68 Conscientious community planning of health
services to meet the anticipated need most economically could also give
rise to antitrust challenges, such as allegations of an illegal market
division.69
Agreements concerning providers' prices and advertising are also
subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Agreements not to adver-
tise or prohibitions against advertising by professional associations,
accrediting entities, and certifying bodies are unlawful."0 Even where
the agreement or prohibition is a part of the entity's ethical code, the
Federal Trade Commission has declared them unlawful. This is espe-
cially true where the agreements concern advertising prices. Also
according to the Federal Trade Commission, the Relative Value Study
Scale, a system of categorizing procedures in order to place a value
upon them, is a price-fixing mechanism because of its tendency to
65 One area of concern currently is the variety of shared purchasing arrangements
employed by some health care facilities as a result of the pressure to contain costs. See, e.g.,
Tolan, What are the Antitrust Implications of Shared Purchasing for Hospitals?, HOSPITALS 76
(Oct. 16, 1979).
66 The exclusive contract is defended as a pragmatic management tool for some hospital
departments where the following are needed: better control and standardization of procedures,
greater operational efficiency for the departments, better scheduling, better monitoring of
patients within departments, greater economy, amassing expertise among operators or users of
equipment and facilities. Dattilo v. Tucson General Hosp., 23 Ariz. App. 392, 396-97, 533 P.2d
700, 704-705 (1975); Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60, 67-68, 311 A.2d 634, 638
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974). Compelling arguments relying on these objectives can
be made for departments such as pathology and radiology where continued availability of doc-
tors and orderly use of sophisticated equipment are imperative. Kessenick, Physicians' Access to
the Hospital: An Overview, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 66 nn.130-38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Kessenick].
67 National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 101
S.Ct. 2415 (1981).
61 Sosa v. Board of Managers of Vai Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1971); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist., No. 78-750 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1981). See also
Kessenick, supra note 66, at 70-71.
6 See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,
101 S.Ct. 2415 (1981). See generally Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945)
(geographic division along product lines illegal); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) (geographic division illegal).
10 American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (agreements not to advertise);
American Dental Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 403 (1979).
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standardize the charges for various types of professional services and
procedures.7' Essentially, the Commission charges that adherence to
the Relative Value Study Scale freezes the relationship among fees for
different and distinct procedures; once published, the scale makes it
simple for physicians to fix prices by merely agreeing upon a uniform
conversion factor.72
The granting or denial of medical staff privileges may be subject
to challenge under the antitrust laws, especially where the excluded
practitioner is unable to practice, such as where there is only one
hospital in town,73 or where medical staff membership is conditioned
upon use of that facility exclusively.7 ' In a recent case, 7" chiropractors
charged the American Medical Association, a number of certifying
entities such as the American College of Surgeons, state and local
medical societies, the American Hospital Association, the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and several individual defen-
dants with conspiracy to monopolize health care services and to unrea-
sonably restrain licensed chiropractors from competing in the delivery
of health services. The American Medical Association asserted the
exercise of its first amendment rights in its defense. 76 The plaintiffs
were not successful in this federal district court case, but an appeal of
that decision is certain. In National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontol-
11 In April, 1979, the California Medical Association signed a consent order which pro-
hibited it from continuing the Relative Value Study activities in which it had engaged since 1956.
The order describes the study as listing comparative numerical values for medical and surgical
procedures and services; they are usually stated in nonmonetary amounts which are easily con-
vertible into a dollar fee by applying a dollar conversion factor to the basic unit. California
Medical Ass'n, 93 F.T.C. 519 (1979) (consent decree filed Apr. 17, 1979). See also American
College of Radiology, 89 F.T.C. 144 (1977) (Federal Trade Commission consent order accepted
Mar. 1, 1977); United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077.
72 Address by Walter T. Winslow, Seminar on Antitrust in the Health Care Field,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 8, 1979. Although there were many disclaimers that he did not officially
speak for the Commission, the FTC staff member indicated that the Supreme Court had made it
clear in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), that professional organizations
would be subjec to antitrust scrutiny. He also stated that the Goldfarb decision and National
Soc'y Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), emphatically laid to rest the
idea that professional associations are not accountable for antitrust transgressions-there will be
no justification for restraint based on reference to other public benefits.
" Cf. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist., No. 78-750 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1981), at 22,
where the court found a minimal anticompetitive effect from an exclusive contract for
anesthesiology services. The court stated, "[t]he East Jefferson group does not enjoy a monopoly
nor does it control a substantial share of the provision of services in the relevant area." Id.
11 A restraint of trade of some type obviously occurs where a practitioner dependent
upon use of a hospital is denied staff privileges in the only hospital in the geographic area. This
issue has not been directly answered by the courts, however.
1, Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, No. 76 C377 (N.D. 11. 1981).
76 Id.
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ogy Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City," a new hospital brought an
antitrust cause of action against the insurer for refusal to grant par-
ticipating status to hospitals without construction approval from the
local health planning agency. The Supreme Court, in a recent
unanimous ruling in this case, held that implicit in the health planning
law is not a repeal of the antitrust laws for health planning activities.78
Peculiarities of Health Care: The Market and Formulation of
Cost Containment Policy
Neither a perusal of the legislative history of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act nor an analysis of relevant case law serve as a guide in
the appropriate application of the antitrust laws to health service
agreements. Both legal issues and national policy considerations must
be dealt with in the context of the health care crisis.
The Crisis in Health Care
Health care, once solely the province of the private sector, has en-
joyed prominence as a political issue for decades. Professionals from
diverse areas within the private and public sectors are searching for
alternatives to an American health system plagued with high costs and
failure to meet patient demand because of inaccessibility or inap-
propriateness of available services. Skyrocketing costs have resulted in,
among other things, broader-based support for national health insur-
ance.79 Despite identification of many of the health system's ills, long-
" 101 S.Ct. 2415 (1981). The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the district court; the lower courts had held that there was such an implied
repeal. 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'g 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
" The opinion of the Court concerned only the insurer's response in this instance to the
health planning process, and n.18 reads: "[W]e emphasize that our holding does not foreclose
future claims of antitrust immunity to other factual contexts .... Where, for example, [a health
systems agency (HSA)] has expressly advocated a form of cost-saving cooperation among pro-
viders, it may be that antitrust immunity is 'necessary to make the [National Health Planning
and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300K et seq.] work.' . . . . Such a case
would differ substantially from the present one, where the conduct at issue is not cooperation
among providers, but an insurer's refusal to deal with a provider that failed to heed the advice of
an HSA."
As in the Royal Drug case, the antitrust laws have yet to be applied to these actions of
the defendant. After both cases, it is clear that there will be a good deal of litigation in the future
to determine whether the antitrust laws are applicable.
" See selected Hospital Cost Containment Proposals: Major Provisions, Comm. on
Finance, United States Senate, Subcomm. on Health Staff Report, Oct. 11, 1977. See also the
Carter administration's Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1979 submitted to the Senate by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare past-Secretary Joseph Califano in Mar. 1979.
The proposal is representative of the mechanisms conceived by policymakers. The proposal per-
tained only to hospital expenditures and would trigger a mandatory 9.7% cap only when those
expenditures exceed the set level and then only for a short time. These mechanisms are attractive
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range policies and solutions have yet to be developed and accepted.
While the debate ranges from a totally public national health service to
a free market system where costs are controlled by the market, much
attention is paid to the concept of cost containment."
Competition Versus Regulation as a Solution:
Is There a, Health Care Market?
According to the normative model of the market, an increase in
demand causes an increase in price, which in turn induces profit-
seeking firms' to increase supply. Increased supply then lowers prices,
creating a new equilibrium. 2 Therefore, if the demand for medical ser-
in light of the fact that 47.5% of the health care dollars in the United States goes to hospital and
nursing home care, according to the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health.
BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1978, at 60. Although the first national health insurance plan was
drafted in 1914 by the American Association for Labor Legislation and submitted to the state
legislatures without success, comprehensive health insurance is still not politically feasible on a
national level. Some commentators perceive that the middle class has a new-found or renewed
interest in national health insurance, which may portend increased momentum in the future.
Wall. St. J., Jan. 1, 1979, at 16, col. 1; Roberts & Bogue, The American Health System: Where
Have All the Dollars Gone?, 13 HARV. J. ON LEais. 635 (1976). The current conservative tenor
of the country suggests that a national health insurance plan at this time is very unlikely.
30 Responses from the private sector include review of hospitals by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation, the voluntary effort popularized during the Carter administration, and self-
insurance by corporations, including preventive health and fitness centers. BusINESS WEEK, Sept.
4, 1978, at 61-63.
See note 71 supra. One commentator has written that the federal government is no longer
timid about intervention in the health arena, as indicated by the legislative record of the last
decade or so, including promotion of the health maintenance organization concept. He notes
that dissatisfaction with federal health policy is in direct proportion to federal responsiveness.
Brown, Formulation of Federal Health Care Policy, 77 BULL. OF N.Y. ACAD. MED. 45-47.
Solutions suggested range from a totally national health system, such as Great Britain's,
to a redistribution of wealth, to equal buying power of all consumers of health services and other
goods. Turshen, "The British National Health Service: Its Achievements and Lessons for the
United States" (unpublished work, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Turshen]. Compare Havighurst,
Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, I J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & LAW 471 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst].
" In an economic analysis of health care applied to physicians and to health care institu-
-ions, it may be argued that hospitals that are nonprofit "firms" cannot be modeled as maximiz-
ng profits, a quality which inheres in the classic market model. Frech and Ginsburg note that
"It]his argument is one-half correct: most hospitals are nonprofit firms. However, most theories
of nonprofit behavior give analytical results similar to profit maximization for the response of
ihe industry to such changes as increased demand or higher costs." Frech & Ginsburg, Public
Insurance in Private Medical Markets-Some Problems of National Health Insurance 79 (1978)
(American Enterprise Institute) [hereinafter cited as Frech & Ginsburg]; Pauly, The Behavior of
Nonprofit Hosoital Monopolies: Alternative Model of the Hospital, in REGULATING HEALTH
FACILITIES CoNs'RucTION (C. Havighurst ed. 1974). See generally Fuchs, Health Care and the
United States Economic System-An Essay in Abnormal Physiology, in ECONOMIC ASPECT OF
HEALTH CARE 95 (J. McKinley ed. 1973).
" It may be, however, that there are no individual markets that operate as classic
markets or that have achieved perfect competition. Each market has individual characteristics,
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vices increases, for example, because of an epidemic or because of in-
creased access to services, such as occurred with the inception of
Medicare, the supply should increase and prices should be driven
down. This admittedly does not happen in the "market" for health
services. The normative model functions according to decentralized
decision making, and the two basic economic units perform the func-
tions just described. Firms produce and supply goods and services, and
households provide and consume goods and services. Firms then
would include hospitals, physicians, and the like, and to some extent,
the government through its direct operation of facilities.8 3 Households
include patients, employers, and the government."'
The issue remains as to whether the classic market theories apply
in the health care system. Undoubtedly it does not operate as a classic
market. The issue then becomes whether these theories can be applied
in the health care system and, if so, how.
Identified aberrations within the health system abound. First
among the identified eccentricities within the descriptive model of the
health services market, the demand function of price is inelastic-utili-
zation decisions are generally made without regard to cost." Second,
the physician's contribution to the decision-making process is generally
greater than the patient/consumer's contribution. In other markets
where the buyer has ample information to make his own informed
decision or where a buyer might decide to forego a purchase if the
price is inordinately high, the buyer exerts significant control on the
and neither the antitrust laws nor economists have ever embraced perfect competition as a
realistic goal. See generally SCHULTZ, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977); Sgontz, The
Economics of Financing Medical Care: A review of the Literature, 9 INQUIRY No. 1 3, 16 (1972);
and MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1949). See also Comment, Antitrust Liability for an
Exchange of Price Information- What happened to Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. REV.
639, 642 (1977) (indicating few American industries conform to perfect model of competition).
'1 The federal government acts as a firm in operating the Veterans Administration
hospital system, for example. See generally, Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 34, at 399.
s Id. at 399 n.52.
" Enthoven, Competition of Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems, in PROCEEDINGS
OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BUREAU OF ECONOMICS at 322
(Mar., 1978). But see Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 81, at 71. Enthoven writes in terms of
utility-maximizing consumers who pay for services out of their own incomes. In addition to
patient-consumers being numbed into cost unconsciousness, he points out that "[i]n the
predominant economy of independent physicians and community hospitals, neither the physi-
cians nor the hospital has complete control over the costs and quality of this product. Each con-
trols some aspects of it, and each responds to his/its own incentives. Not being profit-
maximizing firms facing given market prices, neither has an economic incentive to minimize the
cost of production .... It would be very expensive for the consumer to attempt to shop around
for a less costly product, even if he had the motivation." Enthoven at 322-23. This last point is
particularly true because of the methods of reimbursement existing in the marketplace-cost sav-
ing measures, such as a second opinion prior to surgery, are generally disfavored by insurers.
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demand. 6 Another eccentricity is the existence of barriers to entry into
the market as a provider of health services, which include certification,
accreditation, and myriad requirements for subspecialty training. 7
Freedom of entry serves to ensure that prices are determined com-
petitively and therefore is an integral component of the classic concept
of the economic market. A survey of the literature suggests that agree-
ment as to the deficiencies does not result in agreement as to the causes
of or solutions of these problems. This can be illustrated by comparing
the theories of Fuchs and Kramer88 and Turshen"9 with those of Lef-
fler,9° Helms,9' and Havighurst. 92 Fuchs and Kramer find that demand
is irreparably damaged in the health system because of numerous and
powerful imperfections, including restrictions created by licensure and
professional control of medical education; limitations on practice im-
plicit in the hospital medical staff appointment system; and absence of
forms of rivalry, such as price cutting and advertising.93 Turshen's
56 Frech and Ginsburg suggest that a perfect agency relationship between physician and
patient would result in "combining technical knowledge with the patient's attitudes toward
health, pain, disability, and financial costs. . . . [t]he behavior would correspond to the case
where the patient chooses using perfect technical knowledge." Frech & Ginsburg, supra note 81,
at 73.
s, Blurnstein & Calvani, supra note 34, at 389. Well-recognized barriers include state
licensing, hospital staff privileges, and medical society control at the state and local levels.
11 Fuchs & Kramer, Determinants of Expenditures for Physicians' Services in the United
States, 1948-63, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, NA.
TIONAL BUREAJ OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH #117 at 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fuchs & Kramer].
See also TiTmuss, COMMITMENT TO WELFARE 138-52 (1968). The philosophy opposing private
sector control has been articulated in this way: "Economic growth cannot solve the problem of
poverty without the intervention of comprehensive and deliberately redistributive social poli-
cies .... [P]rivate markets in welfare cannot solve the problem of discrimination and stigma ....
[P]rivate markets in welfare do not offer consumers more choices; and ...social services in
kind, particularly medical care, have characteristics which differentiate them from goods in the
private market." Id. at 139. See generally Buchanan, What Kind of Income Distribution Do We
Want?, 35 ECONOMICA 89 (1968).
" Turshen, supra note 80.
90 Leffler, National Health Insurance: A Social Placebo, CURRENT Topics 24-25 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Leffler].
91 Helms, Contemporary Health Policy: Dealing with the Cost of Care (1978) (printed by
the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research) (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Helms].
92 Havighurst, supra note 80.
Fuchs & Kramer, supra note 89, at 1. They also contend that consumers have different
experience in judging quality of physician services and that physicians play a major role in deter-
mining quality. Such an argument proves too much, however; the contenders leave themselves
open to attack by the market proponents that patient education is a viable solution. Kessel
criticizes the American Medical Association for presuming simultaneously to represent the public
in determining the quality of providers needed and the quality of production standards and to
represent the medical profession: "In other words, the AMA represents both the buyers and
sellers of physicians' services in determining the output of physicians. Given this anomalous
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premise is that health care is not a market good and, this being so, she
finds that a true commitment to welfare and a desire to bolster com-
petition are mutually exclusive; 9 she argues for a totally nationalized
health system. The difference between this view and the free market
alternative is a deeply philosophical one.
Leffler, on the other hand, concludes that the traditional econo-
mic forces of supply and demand do in fact determine price. 95 He
characterizes the laws of supply and demand as the most severe regula-
tors of efficiency in the market.96 He indicates that, should they fail,
incorporation into the public sector should follow, but he finds no
evidence that this has happened in the area of health care. 97 Helms
indicates that strong economic forces do work in medical markets; he
would seek to explain perverse market behavior rather than abandon
the market analysis.9" The aberrant behavior is an efficient and
predictable reaction to a variety of factors.9 9 Havighurst theorizes that
one of those factors is the subsidy provided by the tax laws that direct-
ly results in over-insurance or shallow, first dollar coverage,' 0 which
in turn results in overutilization of services.' 0 ' The employer, provider,
and patient all have little incentive to "shop around"102 or to exercise
restraint in consuming resources. Havighurst promotes cost contain-
ment achieved through the private sector as more likely to be effective
and appropriate in a pluralistic society than would be government-
position, it is difficult to believe that the AMA will ever permit the number of physicians to be
produced that the public is willing to support with its patronage." Kessel, The A.M.A. and the
Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONtEMP. PROBS. 267, 282 (1970).
", Turshen, supra note 80, at 46. Turshen criticizes the English health system for ac-
quiescing to doctors' demands that the private practice of medicine which now drains the public
system be preserved within it; she contends that the preservation of private practice has altered
the state-run system and has breached the principles of uniform and universal health services for
all.
" Leffler, supra note 90, at 25.
96 Id. at 24.
I, d.
" Helms, supra note 91, at 332. See also id. at 334-42 for a discussion of the theory that
consumers can make substitutions in the medical market and the consumers will be liberated if
both consumers and providers are made more cost conscious.
Id. at 343.
'o' Essentially, consumers have insured themselves for great losses and have paid small
premiums. Consumers pay the "first dollar" on medical bills, and the insurer covers the
balance. The over-insurance problem has been exacerbated by the federal tax laws which en-
courage employers and individuals to buy more insurance. With payments not exacted in full for
each good or service, the consumer tends not to choose products based on price. Employers are
encouraged to provide group insurance and employees have an incentive to bargain for more
medical insurance, which is not taxable as wages. Id. at 335.
101 Havighurst, supra note 80.
"I Id. See also note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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sponsored controls.' 03 Those favoring a private sector-based remedy
urge patient education programs and legislation that would spur com-
petition by sharing control over demand between providers and con-
sumers, t hereby destroying disincentives and offering consumers more
alternatives. 
04
Pauly provides the common denominator for the government
regulation and free market theories." °" Pauly, in a highly pragmatic
approach, finds that the answer to whether health care is inherently
different depends on several factors: the type of care, consumer exper-
ience with that care, the type and scope of contact with physicians in-
volved in providing that type of care.'10 His is a broader notion of in-
formation that takes into account information from informal
sources.' 7 The notion of information is important as it stimulates
competition by preparing the consumer for an active, responsible role
in the health market.' 8 Weisbrod, in commenting on Pauly's analysis,
suggests that quality and price information must be distinguished.' 09
While price information will be easier to obtain and provide, it will be
,"3 Havighurst, Role of Competition in Cost Containment, reprinted in Competition in
the Health Sector: Past, Present, and Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY
THE FEDERAl. TRADE COMMISSION BUREAU OF ECONOMICS (Mar., 1978) at 359 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as PROCEEDINGS]. See generally Reynolds, A New Scheme to Force You to Compete for
Patients, MEDICAL ECONOMICS 23 (Mar. 21, 1977) discussion of innovative service configura-
tions). Reynolds discussed Elwood's theory that health maintenance organizations have lowered
costs by forcing classic fee-for-service practices to compete for patients. Because they have been
slow in gaining acceptance, however, Elwood suggests the Health Care Alliance (HCA) as an
alternative; the HCA is a network of entirely new and competing entities. Id. Federal Trade
Commission staff member Walter T. Winslow reported that the Commission remains on the
alert for concerted efforts to frustrate the operation of health maintenance organizations
(HMO): "I want to emphasize that we do not disfavor fee-for-service medicine in relation to
HMO's or other alternative health care delivery systems. We do believe that in the long run, con-
sumers will benefit from the availability of a wide variety of options .. " Remarks of Walter
T. Winslow before the National Health Lawyers Association Seminar on Antitrust in the Health
Care Field (Washington, D.C. Jan. 8, 1979). On the same subject and from the economist's
perspective, Enthoven writes: "Thus, capitation-financed organized systems are not merely a
device for financing the same bundle of services as that offered by the fee-for-service, cost-
reimbursed tuird-party financed medicine; and they are not merely an incentive scheme for
lowering cost or utilization. Rather, they are a framework within which providers can offer very
different product mixes, emphasizing different values, depending upon the tastes of the con-
sumers served." Enthoven, Competition of Alternative Delivery Systems, PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 103, at '130-31.
204 See notes 93 and 95 supra.
10 Pauly, Is Medical Care Different?, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 103, at 19.
2"6 Id. at 24.
101 This notion of information includes that received from family and acquaintances with
similar experiences. Id. at 27, 39-40.
208 Weisbrod, Comment (to Pauly paper), PROCEEDINGS, supra note 103, at 49.
109 Id.
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misleading in situations where the information concerning quality or
effect of care is not readily available or understood." '
A sizeable contingent is currently advocating government regula-
tion of the health sector, although that possible solution is chosen for
myriad and disparate reasons. Some view the market or the product,
health care, as "inherently different,""' while others state that a
survey of the marketplace's actors forces the conclusion that regula-
tion is the only feasible alternative." 2 Those with vested interests may
welcome regulation in anticipation of attaining the prized status of the
regulatee." 3 Commentators suggest that experience in other regulated
industries illustrates the disappointments and dangers of regulatory
systems built by lobbies with powerful, vested interests." I4 The view ac-
cepted for the purposes of this article is essentially that espoused by
Professor Havighurst-before radical revision or replacement of the
American health system, a practical national approach would be to at-
1i0 Id.
"l See notes 87-89 supra.
112 The following statement by Senator Edward Kennedy is representative of this view:
"The different elements of the health care system-employers, employees, doctors, insurance
companies, hospitals-all understand what has to be done. But they all say they can't do it.
There seems to be only one way to get health care costs under control. The federal government
has to become involved." Interview with Senator Edward Kennedy, reprinted in Inglehart,
Health Focus, NAT'L J. 598 (1976). Further, the analysis of Dr. Philip Caper focuses on the
nature of the "industry" rather than on the performance record of or need for governmental
regulation: "Health care is not and should not be considered a commodity, perceived to be the
same kind as other goods and services. Health care is not governed by marketplace economics."
Caper, Regulatory Reform: Highlights of a Conference on Governmental Regtilation, AMERICAN
ENrERPRISE INSTITUTE (Moore ed. 1979).
"I See, e.g., Deregulation on the Road: Truckers Fight to Keep Protective Controls,
Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1979, at 1, col. 8; Drake & Kozak, A Primer on Antitrust and
Hospital Regulation, 3 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 328 (1978); Drake and Kozak, of the of-
fice of Program and Policy Development of the American Hospital Association, state that tradi-
tional forces do not and apparently cannot be made to operate in the health care market. They,
therefore, favor regulation as an instrument for expanding the range of consumer choices: "The
growing interest in the influence of environment and individual behavior on the demand for
health services can provide an opportunity for regulatory programs to enhance the consumer's
role in selecting modes of therapy through altered tax benefits and cost-sharing." Id. at 341.
While Professor Havighurst outlines a market-oriented strategy of this same general type, Drake
and Kozak propose further regulatory intervention in the market to enhance its effectiveness.
The distinction is subtle, but very important, particularly when the vested interests and powerful
lobby of the hospital industry are considered.
" See generally Altman & Weiner, Regulation as a Second Best, in PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 103, at 421; Pauly, id. at 19, 29-30; McClure, The Medical Care System Under National
Health Insurance: Four Models, 1 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 22, 23 (1977) (shift health
care from market good to merit good); Day, Economic Regulation of Insurance in the United
States, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY
(1970); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate: The Case for Electricity, 5 J. OF
LAW & ECON. 1 (1962); Feldstein, Consequences of Hospital Controls, Wall St. J., Apr. 12,
1979, at 24, col.3.
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tempt to motivate the participants operating within the private sector
to act to contain the astronomical costs of health care."1
5
Discussion
Antitrust Analysis of the Pharmacy Agreement
The insurer stated that the purpose of the Pharmacy Agreement
is to provide a less expensive health service to its subscribers, which is
certainly in itself an admirable goal, and it may be that the consumers
would not receive any such price break without an insurer-backed
plan. The actual effect of the agreement in Bexar County, Texas,
however, may be to drive the smaller, independent pharmacies out of
business. It may, at least for the life of the agreement, destroy any
incentives the participating pharmacies might have to decrease their
charges below the two dollars over acquisition cost negotiated by Blue
Shield. Underlying these concerns is the view that providers should not
grow rich in the provision of health services or in the effort to contain
costs of health care.I16 Despite the fact that there is no clear statement
of national health policy, 1 7 the courts and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, in applying the antitrust laws to health care providers, put the
cost containment burden on the insurer. Those branches have deter-
mined to apply the antitrust laws in order to strengthen the market and
promote the beneficial effects of competition therein." 8 On remand,
the Royal Drug case will offer some guidance to insurers as they
negotiate and maintain cost containment agreements with providers on
behalf of their subscribers. A discussion of the antitrust issues likely to
be raised on remand follows.
Per Se Analysis
The advantage of labeling an agreement a per se violation, as
with resale price maintenance," 9 or concerted refusal to deal,2 0 or
I The diametrically opposing view is, of course, to argue for a total antitrust exemption
for insurers-the ultimate regulation.
I6 See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
'17 Health policy has been overshadowed by the general financial woe of the country in
recent times. The proposed Reagan administration budget includes cutbacks in federal subsidies
for health facilities, reimbursement programs, and medical education.
1' This, in part, is precisely what Professor Havighurst has sought; see, e.g., Havighurst,
Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DuKE L.J. 303.
"' Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
120 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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price fixing, 2' is that a violation may be deemed unreasonable with lit-
tle or no analysis of the effect of the practice or any laudatory
justifications for it.'" The per se rule exists in support of the federal
antitrust policy that decisions are to be made competitively rather than
by a "benevolent" corporation with vested interests.'
23
A successful price-fixing challenge must establish an agreement,
which can be inferred,' 2 and the purpose or effect to fix prices.' 25 The
power to affect prices, however, is not required.' 2, What occurred in
Bexar County, Texas, appears to be of a different character. It ap-
pears that an insurer extended unilateral contract offers to each licensed
pharmacy in the area and that the insurer made the offer attractive
in order to secure sufficient acceptances. The result was that the in-
surer contracted with a number of pharmacies to provide health ser-
vices-prescription drugs-to its subscribers. Subscriber choice would
appear to be based on savings and convenience afforded in dealing
with participating pharmacies. The insurer emphasizes that it followed
the advice of the Federal Trade Commission and preserved the legality
of the plan by arriving at the professional dispensing fee of two dollars
independently. In other words, the insurer contends that it neither
solicited nor received input from the retail pharmacies in setting this
price. 111
In accepting the insurer's offer, the participating pharmacies
sought to increase their profits, either through increased volume of
prescriptions filled or, more likely, through increased sales of non-
121 Price fixing among competitors is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
"I There is no such thing as a reasonable price fix, according to the Court in United
States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (refusal to consider reasonableness of com-
pany's action).
"I Id. at 397: "The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the
elimination of one form of competition." But see Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist., No.
78-750 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 1981) at 17, where the court states that the per se rule should not be
applied to cases involving professional activities.
124 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914) (circumstantial evidence). See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226
(1939): "[K]nowing action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence
to the scheme and participated in it."
2' The effect on price can even be indirect. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940).
26 Socony dictum established that the power to affect or in fact having the effect of fix-
ing prices was not a prerequisite to finding a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 224.
2' Brief for Petitioner at 8, 26, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
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pharmaceuticals to consumers entering the retail drugstores for the
purpose of having prescriptions filled there. 2 While it is reasonable to
assume that the chain drugstores accepting the insurer's offer believed
that nonparticipation would place them at a competitive disadvantage,
this alone is not enough to constitute the agreement or concerted action
contemplated by the per se price fix analysis under the Sherman Act.
Certainly, acting in anticipation of the actions of competitors is a com-
mercial reality, and no amount of sympathy for the independent phar-
macy, unable to afford to participate in this plan, allows avoiding the
requisite agreement or concert without additional facts, which have
not yet appeared in the Royal Drug litigation.
Assuming facts are marshalled establishing an agreement between
competitors, the analysis then focuses on the effect of the plan. The
potential pernicious effects include stabilizing'" prices or establishing
a ceiling on prices of retail drugs. 3 ' If the participating pharmacists
were to combine for the purpose of or with the effect of engaging in
predatory pricing, a per se violation would be established. 3' This
would be the case, for example, where the participating pharmacists
were actually conspiring to drive the independent pharmacies out of
business and to that end lowered their prices below marginal costs for
a period of time.'3 2 Where the anticompetitive purpose is not so clear,
the anticompetitive effect should be clearly demonstrated.' Depend-
ing upon the particular facts, this effect could take place within the
population of subscribers or within the retail pharmaceutical market
generally in that locale. 3 "
Where buyer and seller agree on a price at which the buyer must
resell a product or service, the buyer's freedom to resell at prices deter-
mined by his individual response to market competition is not main-
"'8 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
129 The Sxcony Court used a very broad sword to strike down price fixing, speaking in
terms of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing" prices. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Blue Shield contended that it had no desire to
stablize prices in the retail market for prescription drugs at an artificially high level; rather, the
Pharmacy Agreement represented an attempt to prevent prices from rising as quickly as they
might have without it. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 26, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
"20 Brief for Appellee at 27, 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons. Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
232 See generally id.
23 See notes 169-187 infra for an analysis of a possible Robinson-Patman challenge.
233 This is a pragmatic approach, but it is one attribute of the antitrust laws that the
business community criticizes as destroying an element of predictability and thereby impeding
the operation of the commercial sector.
"I Compare note 170 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "effect on
competition" component in the Robinson-Patman analysis.
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tained.' 3 This is known as vertical price fixing or resale price main-
tenance. In Albrecht v. Herald Co.,' 3 the Court found that section 1
of the Sherman Act was violated where a publisher disciplined a
distributor who had ceased to adhere to the maximum resale price set
by the publisher. 37 The Court refused to interpret the earlier Kiefer-
Stewart rule, 38 holding that maximum price agreements were per se
unlawful, as applicable only to horizontal agreements. I39 The justifica-
tions for the per se status are several. First, potential buyers are likely
to be discouraged from entering the market by the lowering .of
prices."' Second, the set price might not be as competitive as it could
otherwise be. Third, the dealer would be deprived of a reasonable rate
of return where the maximum price is set below cost. '4' Contrast a ver-
tical price fix to the facts of the Royal Drug case where Blue Shield as
a buyer has offered a contract to the participating pharmacy as a
seller. The most that can be said is that the insurer has contracts with
several pharmacies to provide services to the insurer's subscribers in
accordance with those contract terms.
The Blue Shield Association in its Amicus Brief to the Supreme
Court argues that the reimbursement formula found in the Pharmacy
Agreement was designed "to allow the interplay of market forces in
the retail drug industry to determine the cost of prescriptions."" 2 The
association essentially relies on three elemehts to illustrate the free play
of market forces. First, the acquisition cost is said to be determined by
market forces in the wholesale drug industry and unaffected by the
pharmacy agreements. 43 Second, the deductible, or dispensing fee,
was determined unilaterally based on relevant precedent holding that
section 1 of the Sherman Act was violated by concerted action by
pharmacists acting with the intent and effect of fixing retail drug
prices.""' Further, a Justice Department official has interpreted com-
3I L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 337 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN].
136 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 152 n.8.
"' Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
'" But see Justice Harlan's opinion in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
140 New entrants must often lower their prices at the beginning in order to dislodge
previously established commercial relationships; therefore, the ability to lower prices would be
an important factor in the decision to enter the industry's market.
14 The nonparticipating pharmacies argue in effect that the Pharmacy Agreement as of-
fered would deny nonparticipants a reasonable rate of return. Brief for Appellee at 7, 440 U.S.
205 (1979).
',' Brief for Blue Shield Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 28-29, id.
" Id. at 34-35.
14 North Calif. Phamaceutical Ass'n, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862
(1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962).
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pliance with those cases to require retail pharmacists to refrain from
bargaining collectively with insurers over the amount of the dispensing
fee or making a joint decision to reject or to accept the offer.' Third,
the Justice Department has followed the development of prescription
drug programs and has repeatedly stated that they do not violate the
antitrust laws.146
Even if the reimbursement formula is arrived at competitively, a
price-fixing charge based on allegations of a ceiling or stabilization of
prices remains to be answered. Again, the Pharmacy Agreement ap-
pears to pass muster. The Blue Shield Association contends that the
insurer is compelled to establish and continue plans at the behest of
the employers and, therefore, must meet the employees' demands for
financial savings and convenience.'" 7 Obviously, for such a plan to
succeed, the insurer must consider the individual pharmacist's reaction
to the fee incorporated in the plan as offered; a dispensing fee that the
pharmacist is likely to accept must be offered. 48 If the pharmacists re-
ject the plan, employers will almost certainly seek another carrier. Blue
Shield argues that participating pharmacists are absolutely free to dis-
count their dispensing fee below two dollars in order to gain a com-
petitive advantage over participating and nonparticipating pharmacies
in the area. 49 What troubles the nonparticipants is that no more than
two dollars can be added to the acquisition cost under the agreement,
thereby limiting the pharmacy's profit and making participation by in-
dependent pharmacies with higher overheads impossible.' This fee,
determined unilaterally by Blue Shield and accepted by each pharmacy
individually, does not violate the Sherman Act but, rather, constitutes
a valid contract determined fairly by the parties bargaining at arm's
length. If the bargaining positions are unequal, as where the insurer
has monopsony power in the market, it seems that the plan would fail
under antitrust scrutiny.'"' The result may be the same as that under
the pre-Royal Drug interpretation of section 2(b) of the McCarran-
]Ferguson Act-the agreement is valid until the insurer attempts to
"I Bern:stein, "Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Prescription Plans," 10-11, Address to An-
nual Convention of Retail Druggists, Las Vegas, Nev. (Oct. 15, 1969), as cited in Brief for Blue
Shield Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 30, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
"I6 Id. For a discussion of the reasonableness of the dispensing fee, see Brief for Blue
Shield Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 33, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
1,1 Id. at 30.
"4 See also id. at 34.
149 Id. at 4.
"', This brings to the forefront the unanswered policy question, which is what the end
result of this market protection should be.
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coerce, boycott, or intimidate. However, the impact of the section 1
analysis where the insurer has monopsony power or where the pro-
viders of health services are engaging in anticompetitive practices must
not be underestimated.
152
The nonparticipating pharmacies have also charged the insurer
and participating pharmacies with a concerted refusal to deal, or a
group boycott, 15 which the Supreme Court has declared a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 5 " This prohibition is not a stranger to pro-
viders of health services; for example, refusal of medical staff
privileges is often the subject of litigation.155
The argument made by the nonparticipating pharmacies is that
the procedure for reimbursement of subscribers who choose to deal
with them was purposely made so troublesome and unattractive that
subscribers were effectively coerced to boycott the nonparticipants.
Further, the nonparticipants attack the reimbursement formula applied
when a subscriber deals with a nonparticipant as imposing a financial
penalty that is calculated to result in the refusal to deal by the
subscribers. They contend that it is unnecessary to use a different
reimbursement procedure when a nonparticipating pharmacy is
selected by the subscriber. Unlike the situation in which a subscriber
deals with a participating pharmacy, the renegade subscriber must pay
the pharmacy the entire retail price of the drug and, in addition,
receives less in reimbursement from the insurer.
The coercion argument is not persuasive in light of the fact that
the subscribers are free to do business with the nonparticipants.
Regarding the challenge that the separate procedure is unjustified, the
insurer's response, if supported by the facts,1"6 is satisfactory:
"I This makes it possible to uphold valid agreements and to invalidate agreements by in-
surers bearing so much market power that the potential for abuse is the paramount concern.
This is not to say that "big is bad," but rather to reaffirm the need for a flexible, sensitive
method of assessing such activities and arrangements between providers of health services and
other products.
" Brief for Respondents at 109, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
's, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
25 See, e.g., Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,933 (FTC 1975) (denial of staff privileges per se violation where staff
physicians have right to veto); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 73 (1977) (restrictive or unnecessary membership requirements or expulsion
from organizations where membership economically desirable); Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (denial certification or accreditation);
U.S. Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. 111. 1975) (ethical
or other prohibitions limiting scope of medical practice).
"' This should be fairly easy to prove, although additional discovery is almost certain to
be needed, as the case comes back up through the courts on the merits of the antitrust
challenges.
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The administrative costs of processing claims for drugs purchased from
non-participating pharmacies are higher than those purchased from
participating pharmacies. In the former case, the insured typically sends
in only a receipt for the prescription, which does not contain sufficient
information to process the claim. Thereafter, Blue Shield must corres-
pond with the insured to obtain additional information necessary to
prepare a proper claim form. In addition, unlike claims information
submitted by participating pharmacies, information received from in-
sureds is not coded on special forms so as to allow direct input into
Blue Shield's computers. The amount of work necessary to enter such
information in data processing equipment is thus increased if an in-
sured's prescription is filled by a non-participating pharmacy. .... "I
Assuming these facts are as represented, use of this reimbursement
scheme is no more coercive than is the familiar commercial practice of
discounting certain items in order to increase sales of those items.
Directing purchasing patterns is not inherently unlawful under the
antitrust laws; it may promote economies of scale and other efficien-
cies of operation.'S8
It must be remembered that all licensed pharmacies were afforded
the opportunity to participate in the plan. '1 9 The purpose of the
federal antitrust laws, once again, is to keep the marketplace function-
ing competitively. The laws were not designed to keep weaker entities
afloat in the marketplace, nor were they designed to secure a certain
level of profit for those entities.
Analysis Under the Rule of Reason
If no per se violation is found, the rule of reason analysis would
be applied to determine if there has been a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The rule of reason applies in a section 1 analysis where
there is no "vertical restraint which has achieved a garden variety
status. That is, it is not a tie-in, an exclusive dealing arrangement....
Consequently, as the district court indicated, it must be carefully
'" Brief for Appellant at 5-6 n.5, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
,s See Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Medical Soc'y, [1980-1] TRADE CAS. 78,152 (9th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1980), modified [1980-I Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,573, cert.
granted No. 80-419 (U.S. Sept. 16, 1980), where the district court held that certain novel ar-
rangements should not be per se violations. In that case, medical organizations were charged
with antitrust violations for establishing maximum physician fees under agreements with health
insurance carriers. See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 135, at 2-7, for a discussion of allocative
efficiency as an antitrust goal and the two principal approaches of the Harvard and Chicago
schools.
"' The argument is simply that no one has been excluded from dealing with anyone else.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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looked at on its own facts, in order to reveal whether any restraint of
trade it causes is 'reasonable.' ,,160
One instance in which condemnation is incurred under the rule of
reason is where the provider of goods or services also controls the in-
surer; there the potential for abuse is so great that, on balance, an
unreasonable restraint of trade can be found. 1 ' In this situation, the
providers, for example, could agree to increase prices and carry out
their agreement through their control of the insurers; the latter would
have to possess substantial power in the insurance market, however. 62
These facts are not present in the Royal Drug case. If the insurers are
not provider-controlled but do possess substantial or monopoly power
in the market, and the independent pharmacy goes out of business
ostensibly because of the great success of the participating pharmacies
under the Pharmacy Agreement, the rule of reason analysis provides
the framework for a constructive balancing of interests. While the
Sherman Act does not promise protection for weaker firms, the
balancing approach of the rule of reason would presumably fall on the
side of the endangered independent pharmacies were offensive acts to
be directed to subscribers, competitors, or the public in general 63
without the least concomitant benefit to the subscribers of the insured.
Another alternative under the rule of reason analysis is the ap-
proach that was adopted in the Chicago Board of Trade decision.' 64 In
that case the Court found that it was too simple a test merely to ask
whether the agreement restrained competition. The government failed
in its attempt to show discrimination against any part of the public,
alteration of supply or change in prices, resulting hardship, and design
of the plan specifically to alter supply. 65 The Court stated that the
true test is whether the agreement "merely regulates" and thereby pro-
motes competition, or destroys and suppresses competition. 166 The
Court suggested that it is necessary to consider facts peculiar to the
business, the conditions before and after imposition of the restriction,
"60 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
161 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Royal Drug case, Havighurst wrote that
he hoped that the issue of applicaton of the antitrust laws would be resolved in a manner to
guarantee insurers wide latitude in using provider agreements for cost containment purposes
while also giving providers protection in true monopsony situations. Havighurst, supra note 80,
at 330 n.126.
2 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, n.6, 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
161 This, in the final analysis, is the objection to predatory pricing.
z6, Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
261 Id. at 238.
266 Id.
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and actual and probable effects of the restraint. 67 Fifteen years later
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Appalachian .Coals, Inc. v.
United States,'16 directing attention to the reasons for adopting the
restraint, including economic conditions, intent, and effect. While
these two decisions are perhaps anomalous, they have not been over-
ruled and should not be ignored as an analytical alternative in a com-
pelling factual setting. 169 For example, in certain situations an insurer
might be justified in using policy terms to effect a group boycott by
subscribers.17 0 Similarly, according to one commentator, a noncompe-
titive market may be made more competitive by an agreement between
private parties operating in that market.17 ' The Act is not intended to
make unlawful arrangements that affect price by improving competi-
tion. 172
The Price Discrimination Analysis Under the
Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act,'7 which amends section 2 of the
Clayton Act,174 prohibits any person engaged in commerce from discri-
161 Id.
-6 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
69 Of course, the most favorable situation is one in which the providers are motivated to
establish or participate in a cost containment agreement to obtain a high quality product, a
variety of services, and a lower price, and where these objectives are reached.
"I This could include favoring a hospital with lower per day room rates, or a less com-
plicated reimbursement system such as encountered in the Royal Drug facts, as well as other in-
centives for dealing with the most efficiently operated providers.
171 One analysis proposed for applying the antitrust laws to nonprofit entities uses the
following criteria: "1) Apply standard antitrust analysis to determine if illegal anticompetitive
acts have been committed, without considering the social benefits that the firm confers on socie-
ty. 2) If the entity has committed illegal acts, determine whether it pursues a social benefit that
the competitive market is unable to achieve. 3) If there is such a market failure, determine
whether the anticompetitive activity is necessary for its solution. 4) If so, balance the welfare loss
from the anticompetitive activity against the value of the social interests that are served." Note,
Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. Rnv. 802, 812 (1980). The author of this analysis
contrasts his approach with the current approach and indicates that the "proposed test looks for
more than the mere existence of a noncommercial motive before according a particular activity
special treatment." Id.
"I SuLLrvAN, supra note 135, at 200. For an enlightening discussion of policy objectives
and possible guidelines for applying the antitrust laws in this context, see Note, Antitrust and
Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARv. L. REv. 802, 811-16 (1980). See also Note, Tackling Intercollegiate
Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655 (1978).
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973).
17, See note 2 supra. The Clayton Act provides: "Sec. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
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minating between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality. There must be at least two purchases and an actual sale,
as opposed to a consignment, lease, or agency. Further, a tangible arti-
cle must be sold-a commodity, good, ware, product, or merchan-
dise.'7 The seller must not discriminate with respect to the selling
price, discounts, or credit terms offered. Injury to a competitor or a
customer of the seller is also required. 7 6 Statutory defenses included in
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them. .. ." (emphasis added). 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914).
173 The question arising is whether Blue Shield sold services or commodities through its
Pharmacy Agreement in Bexar County, Texas. The Blue Shield Association refers to the plan as
one to "deliver promised drug benefits" (emphasis added), indicating the national organization's
view of "drug benefits" as a service rather than a good. Brief for Blue Shield Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae at 22, 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Although there is little doubt that the Pharmacy Agreement
determines the price of the prescription drugs, the insurer contends that providing "a source of
health care goods and services" rather than cash reimbursement is a traditional feature of Blue
Shield and other insurance plans. Brief for Appellee at 13, 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See also note 170
supra.
16 Assuming the sale of a good is established, the next critical jurisdictional elements to
be established are at least two sales by the same seller at discriminatory prices. In this
framework, Blue Shield must be viewed as the seller. The purchases could be either by the par-
ticipating and nonparticipating pharmacists or by the two subscriber groups-those dealing with
participating pharmacists and those dealing with nonparticipating pharmacists. The alternatives
are depicted below:
Figure 1 Figure 2




Subscribers I Subscribers II Pharmacies Pharmacies
In Figure 1, Subscribers I represents the group of subscribers dealing with participating phar-
macies and receiving favorable treatment at the hands of the insurer; Subscribers II represents
subscribers dealing with nonparticipating pharmacies. The analysis resulting from the approach
depicted in Figure 1 is a second line analysis, which refers to competitive injury to buyers of the
seller or supplier. See generally OPPENMEIM & WESorN, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CON-
SUMER PROTECrioN-CAsES AND COMMENTs 831-88, ch. 10, § 3 (3d ed. 1974). This analysis,
although somewhat asymmetrical, proceeds in the following manner: The seller is considered to
relate to the participating pharmacies, on the one hand, and to the subscribers dealing with non-
participating pharmacies, on the other hand, at the same level. This means that the reimburse-
ment of cost to the participating pharmacy and the reimbursement of the Subscriber II group of
75% of the cost of the prescription less the $2 deductible are considered to be the same kind of
transaction. Therefore, the $2 charge representing the only direct charge to subscribers dealing
with participating pharmacies is not a focal point of the analysis. This does not appear to cause
significant problems. Even if all of the jurisdictional elements are satisfied for this analysis,
however, its application is clearly unwise from a policy standpoint. These insurer-negotiated
agreements are well accepted. The ability of insurers to negotiate lower rates for subscribers and
to encourage efficient utilization patterns, where lawful, should not be frustrated by a Robinson-
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the Act,' 77 validating transactions which would otherwise be discrimi-
natory, include cost justification, 7 8 changing conditions affecting the
marketability of goods, 79 and meeting competition.' 80
The insurer must qualify for treatment as a seller possessing
market power. One commentator has characterized the potential of-
fender as a firm that will be able to increase total revenue if it can sell
at relatively higher prices to buyers with relatively inelastic demands. '8 '
The sales must evince a disparate ratio between the marginal cost and
the price of the good."' Shoehorning a third-party payor into this
framework, the insurer is the seller of prescription drugs and the
agreement establishes the price the insurer "charges" subscribers.,
Discrimination then occurs only if the seller deals with groups of
buyers with differing elasticities separately. Persons choosing to deal
with nonparticipating pharmacies may be patients with medical emer-
gencies or nonambulatory patients who require twenty-four hour ser-
vice, home delivery, or other special services.
The original plaintiffs particularly fear diversion of customers to
the participating chain pharmacies. A Robinson-Patman violation
might be found, based on horizontal injury, if (1) the independent
pharmacies and Blue Shield are considered to operate on the same
plane, that is, horizontal competition is at issue; (2) the asserted
administrative cost justification for the higher reimbursement rate is
not supported by the facts; and (3) the nonparticipating, independent
Patman Act challenge. Figure 2, according to the analysis in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395
U.S. 642 (1969), reh. denied, 396 U.S. 871 (1969), represents a third line injury to competition
case. In Perkins, the Court reached such a conclusion by focusing on the character of the buyers
rather than the fact of a sale to them. Professor Weston has criticized as artificial this analysis of
what he considers to be a second line injury case; he bases his criticism on the premise that the
disfavored retailer was just a buyer. Weston, Lecture at George Washington University National
Law Center (Nov. 11, 1979).
"' For a discussion of defenses in general, see OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 176, at
889-971, §§ 4-7.
H. TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION (1959).
'" See generally The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, at 178-79 (1955) (proviso explained); Steele, Section 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act-.Rules for Meeting Competition in the Past and Present, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
1223, 1250-51 (1968) (comprehensive discussion).
"' The actions of the seller with knowledge who discriminates in good faith are
limited-he may only meet, not beat, the price of the competitor or competitors. Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
"' SULrIVAN, supra note 135, at 681.
112 With regard to the price of the good, the statute itself refers to the "cost of manufac-
turing"; this illustrates the difficulty in relying on Robinson-Patman to make fair the provision
of what in actuality is a service.
"I Although this is in effect what happens under such plans, this casting is artificial.
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pharmacies are caused losses leading to a financial demise.184 Although
the Federal Trade Commission appears to consider price discrimina-
tion plus resulting diversion as constituting a prima facie case under
Robinson-Patman,s s courts have required something more, such as
significant reduction in the number of sellers, significant increase in
concentration, or merely persistent discrimination if the result is a
drastically declining price structure.'8 6 Even if those elements were to
be established in Royal Drug on remand, the Anheuser-Busch 8 7 deci-
sion stands for the proposition, in an analogous situation, that it is
lawful for a firm to reduce its prices in one of several regional,
oligopolistic markets as long as it does not act in a predatory or vindic-
tive manner in so doing.' 8 In that case, the court viewed the price cuts
as part of a general heightened sales effort-a lawful attempt to gain a
larger market share.' 8 9
With regard to vertical effects, the subscribers dealing with non-
participating pharmacies presumably could be reached under the
Robinson-Patman analysis, but only if the asserted justification for
the reimbursement differential fails in light of facts developed for the
case on remand. 90 It seems that the difficulty with regard to vertical
effects is that it is conceptually troubling to regard the favored
customer as a profit-making entity in this fact setting. Some circuits
have indicated that a profit penalty upon the disfavored buyer is all
I With regard to second line injury, the prevailing view appears to require injury to
competition, rather than injury to a competitor. This has not been clearly established, however,
and may still represent an avenue for protecting lone competitors. It is not clear from the facts
as presented in any of the three Royal Drug opinions that there has been any injury to competi-
tion in the market, although there is certainly that potential if the independent pharmacies are
driven out of business. Predatory pricing would clearly warrant invalidation. For justifiction of
the cost differential based on claim processing costs, see Brief for Blue Shield Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae at 16-20, 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.5, id. But see note 175 supra.
"I Corn Products Ref. Co. v. FrC, 144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726
(1945); General Nat. Gas Corp. (FTC Dkt. 7782, June 30, 1960). But see SULLIVAN, supra note
135, at 684-875 n.5 (ch. 8B § 221), suggesting that the commission's decision seems inconsistent
with the strict construction test. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 800 (1969), aff'd
sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co., 68 F.T.C. 217, 260 (1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966); Champion
Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
1I6 Chapman v. Rudd Paints & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Borden Co. v.
FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1967); Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 702-705
(9th Cir. 1964).
363 U.S. 536 (1960).
' , Of course, lines between vindictive and aggressive competition are inherently unclear
and perhaps arbitrary.
"' The declining market with which the Robinson-Patman Act is concerned is not the
situation found in the retail market for prescription durgs.
"' SULLIVAN, supra note 135, at 693 n.7 (ch. 8C § 224).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
that need be shown and that this is inferred from the cost differential
itself; evidence of low profit margins and price sensitive conditions
may warrant an inference of injury upon a mere showing that buyers
were charged different prices.' 91
A successful challenge under the Robinson-Patman Act adds little
to what is offered under the Sherman Act, particularly under the Sher-
man Act's rule of reason analysis. Fitting the Royal Drug facts into
the Robinson-Patman framework and casting the insurer as villain is
tortuous; it does a disservice to the Act as well as to the litigating
parties and subsequent litigants. Even though the Robinson-Patman
Act ostensibly protects the smaller, independent competitor whereas
the Sherman Act's orientation is to afford no special protection to
smaller concerns but rather to preserve fair competition in the
marketplace, possibly at the expense of the smaller concern, the rule of
reason analysis, as discussed above, offers a pragmatic and promising
approach--a way to balance preserving the need for competition with
the need to protect consumers.
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Policy Implications
This article presents the broad context within which the Royal
Drug case arose. Until some action is taken by Congress, the antitrust
laws will be applied to agreements such as the Pharmacy Agreement
challenged in that case, despite the belief held by some that market
principles cannot be applied to the provision of health services because
the health system is inherently different. The foregoing analysis indi-
cates that the agreement is likely to withstand the scrutiny of the anti-
trust laws and suggests which additional facts would lead to invalida-
tion. While such an agreement should not give rise to a per se Sherman
Act violation, the rule of reason should be applied in an effort to
preserve competition while protecting the various groups concerned
with prices and delivery of health services and health-related goods.
The general deregulatory thrust of the current administration suggests
that the members of the market will be left to police themselves and,
therefore, that the antitrust laws and enforcement efforts of the
"I Standard Motor Products, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 (1959); E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S' 941
(1958).
", See generally 3 OPPENHEIM & WESTON, THE LAWYER'S ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
SOURCEBOOK (1971) (House and Senate and Conference Committee Reports reprinted); RowE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Act, app. (1970) (text of proposed bills
preceding that finally enacted reprinted).
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Federal Trade Commission will be relied upon to eliminate abuses
within the market.
In the wake of the Royal Drug decision, insurers will continue to
lobby for a total exemption but with renewed fervor. The antitrust
exemption may be sought by those whose faith in the body of judicial-
ly developed antitrust law has faltered, as well as by those with vested
interests, such as insurers and other providers.' 93 'While recognizing the
potential vagueness in the antitrust laws that plagues business, the
antitrust laws, particularly the rule of reason analysis, nonetheless pro-
vide a method for validating agreements truly meant to contain costs,
though compromising competition to some degree, while invalidating
those agreements which are anticompetitive on the balance.
Although the antitrust exemption contemplated by the commer-
cial insurers would allow combining to bargain effectively for lower
costs, it might nonetheless result in a significant restraint on competi-
tion. Further, it is not clear that all such bargaining must be done on a
grand scale.19' A more prudent approach would be to allow the in-
surers to operate under the antitrust laws for a period of time to allow
for a reasoned analysis indicating whether an exemption is necessary.
There is, of course, the possibility that insurers will not make such
agreements without some promise of an exemption. It may be neces-
sary to consider some legislative inducements in that event.19
Another possibility is judicial fashioning of a narrow exemption,
comparable in scope to the Parker doctrine, that would allow for
approaching a cost containment agreement in a slightly different man-
ner, recognizing the distinct character of the third party intermediary
as well as the distinct character of the product. The Justice Depart-
" A draft statute prepared by the commercial insurers' Health Insurers' Association of
America and dated May 9, 1978, established a total exemption from the antitrust laws for in-
surers based on the assertion that "federal and state antitrust laws currently inhibit efforts by in-
surers, health benefit purchasers, and health care providers to undertake effective health cost
containment activities." Draft Statute for an Antitrust Exemption for Health Cost Containment
Activities, Health Insurers Association of America, Washington, D.C. at 1 (May 9, 1978).
Kramer, Senate Panel Votes Stiff Curb on FTC Powers, Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1979, at Al,
col. 1 (lobbyists succeeded in curtailing FTC activity in such areas as children's television adver-
tising, used car lots, the insurance industry, and consumer standards), (effective antiregulatory
sweep by powerful lobbyists).
14 This, of course, would raise the question of negotiations across state lines, as in the
case of insurers dealing with giant multistate corporations.
I See Pertschuk testimony, Skyrocketing Health Care Costs: The Role of Blue Shield,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-34 (1978), as cited in 440 U.S. 205, 232
n.40 (1979). See Leffler, Doctors Fees and Health Costs, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1979, at 16, col. 3;
Havighurst, supra note 80, at 320-25.
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ment, along those lines, had indicated that prepaid prescription drug
plans are not invalid just because some competitors cannot accept the
insurer's offer. 9 To apply the per se rule to prepaid health insurance
plans would fly in the face of all current cost containment efforts in
both the private and public sectors. It is sensible to resort first to alter-
native solutions which can be applied within the existing system, either
as a prelude to radical changes or as a step toward eliminating the need
for radical revision of the system. In addition to the suggestions made
by Professor Havighurst, the antitrust laws should be relied upon as
enforced by the courts via the flexible rule of reason, and by the
Federal Trade Commission. The Commission's hands should not be
tied when so much is at stake and where so much expertise has already
been amassed. A prerequisite, however, is a determination of national
health policy to guide agency and courts in applying the antitrust laws
to the headth sector.
Brieffor United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, 440 U.S. 205 (1979). "Transactions
at a set price, through a . . . series of voluntary bilateral contracts, are not price fixing even i
though large numbers of sellers of services may be involved" (emphasis added). Id. at 11.
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